To most readers, Aristotle’s introduction of natural slavery, along with his many references to “nature,” phusis, throughout the first book of the Politics, implies a foundational role for nature outside and prior to politics. Aristotle, they say, pairs nature with necessity, and uses nature – including human nature – to fix the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in political life. Among these readers, some locate Aristotle’s account of nature, which they take to underpin his ethics and politics, in a science outside of ethics and politics and, finding this science to be outdated, discredited, and altogether unacceptable, they reject his account of nature and hence his politics and ethics as well (Williams 1995, 199, 201; Habermas 1990, 44, 98-99; contra, Bolotin 1997, 2; Arnhart 1998; Park 1997). Others, while agreeing with this rejection of Aristotle's account of nature, remain committed to his ethical and political philosophy and make the case for severing it from parts of his science (Salkever 1990, ch.1). Still others, by contrast, see in Aristotle's treatment of human nature rich resources for his political and ethical philosophy. Of these, some endorse what they take to be Aristotle's elitist exclusion of all but a few aristocratic men from participation in a political life (Strauss 1964, ch.1; Winthrop 1975, Miller 1979). Some argue the opposite, namely that Aristotle’s understanding of human nature is less hostile than is generally thought to women or slaves (Nichols 1992, ch.1; Saxonhouse 1985, ch.4; Booth 1993, ch.2). Still others split the difference, endorsing Aristotle's philosophical account of human nature, while deploring some of his political applications of it (Nussbaum 1995, 87, 120).1

These are not just abstract arguments about nature and politics. One reading justifies elite social hierarchy formation and its perpetuation on the ground that some people are inferior by nature and therefore should excluded from the practices of citizenship and from the distribution of political goods. Another reading justifies expansive political distribution on the ground that human nature yields a set of basic needs and desires essential to human well-being that any good
polity must meet. The differences among these interpretations are deep and it is no small wonder that Aristotle's texts invite all of them.\textsuperscript{2} Despite their differences, these interpretations all claim that human nature determines the ends and purposes of politics.

Aristotle is, to be sure, committed to human nature being the measure of polity. But he is also committed to human nature being itself political [\textit{NE} 1097b12, \textit{Pol.} 1253a2]. Human nature, this suggests, is not foundational or outside and prior to politics. It is, rather, a measure whose terms are set by, even as they set, those of politics, which is to say, it is inherently political.\textsuperscript{3} This view of the relation between nature and politics provides critical insights which are absent from contemporary political theory. What is human nature? To explore this question, I turn to Aristotle’s discussions of citizens and slaves in \textit{Politics} I and III respectively, and then to Aristotle’s philosophical treatment of nature itself.

I. The Force of Nature

A. Citizens

To ask who is a citizen is to ask about the identity or nature of a citizen.\textsuperscript{4} In Aristotle’s hands, this is to ask who deserves to be a citizen or who merits the political good of citizenship.\textsuperscript{5} Aristotle begins his investigation by saying what will not qualify someone for citizenship: not place or location, or the capacity to sue and be sued [\textit{Pol.} 1275a7-11]; not birth, ancestry, or blood [\textit{Pol.} 1275b32-34]. Rather, a citizen is one who participates in ruling and judging [\textit{Pol.} 1275a22-23]; one who rules and is ruled in turn [\textit{Pol.} 1277b13-16]; one who shares in the judicial and deliberative offices of a polity [\textit{Pol.} 1275b18-20].\textsuperscript{6} Place, legal capacity, birth, and parentage – as static qualities and/or markers of status – do not demonstrate desert in Aristotle’s view. What distinguishes the formulations Aristotle approves is their emphasis on activity: “sharing in a constitution,” to use Malcolm Schofield’s phrase, qualifies one for citizenship (Schofield 1999, 141-59).

Aristotle’s emphasis on activity has a curiously tautological or self-contained quality. Practicing citizenship, Aristotle seems to be saying, makes someone a citizen. As Delba
Winthrop puts it, a “citizen is a citizen in being a citizen” (Winthrop 1975, 407). This circularity is a feature not only of Aristotle’s understanding of citizenship but of all activity. Activity, he says, is that which has “in itself its own end” [NE 1140b6]. Activity, *energeia* or *entelecheia*, is that which has, *echein*, what is aimed at – an end or *telos* – in, *en*, itself [Meta 1050a23-24]. Although self-contained, activity is not invulnerable to external influences. There is no “citizening,” or carrying out one’s citizenship, in a vacuum. Indeed, there can be no citizen *qua* citizen prior to the regime of which that citizen is a part [Pol. 1275a3-4]. And so Aristotle pursues his investigation of citizenship by asking who is a citizen of a democracy or of an oligarchy. Being a citizen is regime-dependent not least because what it means to share in a constitution largely depends on the laws, education, and other social and political institutions of that particular constitution. These “externalities” all contribute to the making of citizens [Pol. 1275b4]. Citizenship, this suggests, is a complex combination of doing on the part of citizen practitioners and making on the part of social and political institutions.

At the start of his inquiry into citizenship, however, Aristotle says that it is important to leave to one side “those who have been made citizens and those who have obtained the name citizens in any other accidental way” [Pol. 1275a5-7]. This sentence is key. It carves out what, for philosophical reasons, Aristotle thinks ought not to be included in an inquiry into the identity or nature of a citizen. To be excluded, as already noted, are those who are “made” citizens by the accidents of birth, ancestry or parentage. That is clear enough. But, against the backdrop of Aristotle’s ready acknowledgment of the role of social and political institutions in the making of citizens, how are we to understand Aristotle’s apparently sweeping exclusion of all “made citizens”? A brief consideration of the examples he offers points to a third kind of making, distinct from the accidents of birth and ancestry (which are irrelevant to the question of citizen identity) and distinct from the kind of citizen-making that results from the guidance of a regime’s institutions (which play a key role in the determination of citizen identity). To be excluded from consideration of the nature of a citizen, Aristotle says, are specifically those who have been made citizens “by the magistrates,” a kind of making he analogizes to the production of artifacts, in
this case, kettles [Pol. 1275b29-30]; and those who have been made citizens “after a revolution” [Pol. 1275b35-36]. As with the granting of legal rights under a treaty (which, as “the capacity to sue and be sued,” Aristotle, we saw, rejects as a qualification for citizenship), these are examples of citizens having been made citizens, one might say, ex nihilo: by being so named by a magistrate (akin to obtaining the name by accident); by being produced as such by political force after a revolution; or by the force of legal treaty alone. Citizens who are made citizens in any of these ways do not disclose the nature of a citizen for the same reason as those who are made citizens by accident: their citizenship does not come about in virtue of their own activity as practitioners of citizenship. It is rather granted to them.

Aristotle includes in the proper making of citizens laws, education, and other social and political institutions but not treaty, revolution, or magisterial edict because the former, unlike the latter, do not make irrelevant but rather supervene upon or guide the self-determining activity of the practitioners of citizenship themselves [Pol. 1258a22-23; 1326a1-5]. Indeed, it is impossible to understand a citizen’s identity without taking into account the ways in which it has been shaped by these institutions. Citizen identity is, then, a product of making and doing, where doing is a kind of self-making (by sharing in the constitution, I make myself a citizen) and making, as the guided shaping by laws, education, and other institutions, entails citizenly doing. Accident and force must be pushed to one side when investigating the nature of the citizen because they make irrelevant what is at the heart of both formations of citizen identity: the dynamic and reciprocal relation between identity and action, between doers and their deeds. I call this understanding of human action prohairetic activity to underscore its distinction from Kant’s voluntaristic conception of human action, Hobbes’s deterministic conception, and Descartes’s dualistic one.

Citizens are marked as citizens not only by their particular or individual activities but by sharing in a constitution, in other words, by their collective activity [Pol. 1293a1-6]. Citizen activity produces the social and political institutions that contribute to the making of citizens in the first place. If it is the job of citizens to act as citizens then they do so not only in their
singular activities but also in their collective action by which they make for themselves the social and political institutions which also help make them. Taking democracy, with Josiah Ober, to be constituted neither by institutions alone nor by popular action alone but rather by “dynamic tensions” between institutionalization and participation, there is something nicely democratic about Aristotle’s understanding of citizen identity, read in this way (Ober 1996, 31).12 Citizenship is a matter of individual self-determining activity and it is participatory. By acting in concert, sharing in their constitution, citizens make the institutions which, in turn, as institutions, guide but do not fully determine, their individual activity. As the product of citizenly activity, these institutions are legitimate and binding on each citizen and on the citizenry as a whole.

Reading Aristotle on citizenship and political participation calls for attending not only to those he includes as parts of the whole, however, but also to those he excludes: women, working farmers, shopkeepers, craftsmen, metics, and slaves. For most readers, it is because Aristotle takes the nature of slaves, women, artisans, working farmers to be fundamentally different from the nature of citizens that the former must be excluded from political participation.13 I disagree. To see why, I turn next to Aristotle’s treatment of slavery in Politics I.14

B. Slaves
Aristotle opens his treatment of slavery, as he does his account of citizenship, with the question: who is a slave. Also as he does in the case of citizenship, he parses this as a question of justice – in terms of desert or qualification – and, rejecting parentage, ancestry, and convention (which he calls nomos and equates with violence or force, bie) as inadequate justifications of slavery [Pol. 1255b2, 15], he pushes to one side those who have been made slaves by accident or by force. In the light of these definitional similarities between his accounts of slave and citizen identity, one would expect Aristotle to draw the same conclusion in the case of slavery as he draws in the case of citizenship: if a citizen is a citizen in being a citizen, then so, too, is a slave a slave in being a slave. If being a citizen is to be understood in terms of citizen activity, then being a slave is to be understood in terms of slave activity. If citizen activity (including how this activity is guided by
a polity’s social and political institutions but nothing accidental, forced, or biological) defines the nature of a citizen, then slave activity should define the natural slave.\textsuperscript{15}

These, indeed, are Aristotle’s conclusions. He says, “the good man and the statesman and the good citizen ought not to learn the crafts of inferiors except for their own occasional use; if they habitually practice them, there will cease to be a distinction between master and slave” [\textit{Pol.} 1277b5-7]. He warns against including in the art of household management knowledge on the part of the master of how to do the tasks of slaves [\textit{Pol.} I.7], and he warns his audience of virtuous men in the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} against engaging in slavish kinds of activities [\textit{NE} 1118a21-25, 1125a1, 1128a34]. Aristotle demands this sort of vigilance on the part of citizens, masters, and the virtuous because, as these examples suggest, by performing the activities of a slave one becomes a slave. The reverse is true as well: friendship, says Aristotle, is not possible with a slave as a slave but it is with the slave as a person [\textit{NE} 1161b5-8]. It is possible for a slave, this means, to become a person worthy of friendship. Being a slave, all this suggests, is not fixed.\textsuperscript{16}

If this is right – if slave identity like citizen identity, is determined by \textit{prohairesic} activity – then there is no absolute or necessary difference between slave and citizen.\textsuperscript{17} And if that is right, then the account of slavery in \textit{Politics} I serves not to describe and set apart a domain that is necessary and so non-political, but to warn citizens and slaves alike of their vulnerability (not only to accident and force, both, as it turns out, relatively rare occurrences, but more importantly) to the power of acting in shaping their political destinies (Mara 1995, 286, 296; Davis 1996, 22). It follows that when, in virtue of my self-determining activity, I make myself a citizen or a slave, it is just to so treat me. But notice a fundamental difference between citizens and slaves in this regard: the social and political institutions that supervene upon self-determining activity to produce citizens as citizens and slaves as slaves, are the product of citizen activity alone. Insofar as I am produced as a slave by social and political institutions in whose making I have not myself participated, I am made a slave independently of my agency, independently of my activity. I am, therefore, by the terms of Aristotle's own account, made a
slave by force. As we have already seen, Aristotle insists that the effects of force are to be left out of any consideration of the nature of identity. A study of slaves produced as slaves by exclusionary social and political institutions, then, reveals nothing about the nature of slaves. It does, however, reveal something about the citizens who create those exclusionary institutions, namely that they are prepared to rule despastically, which, for Aristotle, is the unmaking of their polity \([Pol. I.7, V.10; 1292a14-38]\). The practice of slavery and its institution, this means, are bad for citizens both individually and for the citizenry as a whole, which is to say, for the polity.

This is, to be sure, not the usual reading of *Politics* I. To justify it I turn to an exploration of the question Aristotle opens in his discussion of slavery and to which he does not explicitly return in his discussion of citizenship: namely, who is by nature a slave? Aristotle’s consideration of this question imports into the *Politics* language he has introduced in the *Physics*. Parsing this question along two axes, he asks whether nature as matter – as the bodies of people – will distinguish slaves from non-slaves; and he asks whether nature as form – as the souls of people – will do the trick. Up to this point in *Politics* I Aristotle has insisted that nature makes nothing in vain; on the contrary, nature makes things to particular uses and so should mark a slave in a way that shows him to be fit for use as an object of property by giving him a body suited to menial chores \([Pol. 1254b27]\). As it turns out, however, nature makes no reliable distinction between slaves and non-slaves based on physical appearance. The bodies of slaves often belong to masters and those of masters to slaves \([Pol. 1254b31]\). Hence, under its material aspect, as body, nature cannot tell us who deserves to be a slave.

Nature, under its formal aspect, as the soul, does no better. Identifying the human soul with its characteristic activities – intellectual and moral virtue, or excellence, broadly understood – Aristotle’s examination of the soul of the slave pulls in a number of directions: he says that slaves lack the deliberative element \([Pol. 1260a12, 1280a33-34]\), and also that if slaves could not deliberate at all they would not be able to execute their masters’ orders \([Pol. 1255b35]\); he says that slaves are not capable of self-rule \([Pol. 1254b14-17]\), and also that they have the excellence necessary to prevent them from failing in their function through lack of self-control \([Pol.\).
1259b22-8]. The soul, Aristotle remarks, is not a legible marker of natural slavery, for “beauty of soul is not so easy to see” [Pol. 1254b40]. If Aristotle’s answer to the question of who is a slave by nature in terms of form and matter is inconclusive, he also renders problematical the usual articulation of the form/matter distinction itself. Aristotle claims both that slaves are essentially not-form but rather simply matter or bodies waiting for minds as form to impose order upon them [Pol. 1254b15-20], and also that all natural beings, including slaves, are constituted by matter and form [Pol. 1254a35].

How, against this backdrop, might we make sense of the following sentence: “it is clear then that some men are by nature free and others slaves and for these latter slavery is both expedient and just” [Pol. 1255a1-2]? How, in other words, might we understand Aristotle’s defense of natural slavery, which seems to display a lack of parallelism with his treatment of citizenship insofar as it appears to carve out a category of natural being not defined in terms of activity. Is this so? The master-slave relation is natural, says Aristotle, when it benefits both individuals involved, when the interests of the slave and of the master are the same [Pol. 1255b10]. The circumstances under which slavery might benefit a master are clear enough. Under what sorts of circumstances might someone benefit from being a slave? The answer to this question, in the terms of the analysis offered so far, is that a person whose soul is so disordered that it fails to guide his body might well be better off guided by someone else’s soul than left wholly unguided [Pol. 1254b16-20]. Since, as Aristotle has maintained, it is difficult to see and therefore to know whether a soul is well-ordered, evidence of a disordered soul is provided by the characteristic activities in which the person engages. The standard here is not simply “how most slaves act” since this would give the status of slavery too much weight. Nor is there a “natural” criterion, none, at least, in the sense of a necessary one. It is, rather, the activity itself that provides a kind of internal standard sufficient to allow judgment about which ways of living are more slavish than others. In a word, the natural slave engages in the sort of activity that is a falling short of human activity. Slavery is natural, then, when it brings a person who is not engaging in activity as fully as he might, closer to human activity in its fullest sense, even if that
activity is functionally split in a division of labor between the master and the slave. Slavery is
natural when it brings people who do not engage in fully human activity into a relation that
allows them to mirror or approximate it.

Many commentators read Aristotle’s defense of natural slavery as evidence that he is an
embarrassed apologist for slavery, or a product of his times, or simply incoherent on the slave
question (Williams 1993; Waldron 1992; Annas 1996; Saunders 1995).\textsuperscript{21} Malcolm Schofield
argues otherwise. Against “ideological readings” of Aristotle on slavery, and in the name of
“interpretative charity,” he offers “philosophical reasons,” based on his reading of Aristotle on
practical wisdom, for Aristotle’s confusing assessment of the soul of the slave (Schofield 1999,
115-40). Schofield is right, I think, to read Aristotle philosophically rather than ideologically, not
least because the ideological readings cannot explain why, if Aristotle took slavery for granted,
he would submit it to scrutiny. That Aristotle places his discussion of slavery in the central
chapters of the opening book of his treatise on politics, and parses slavery as a question of justice
– which he signals in Politics I.2 is the key question for politics [Pol.1253a7-17] and in Politics
III.9 calls “a question for political philosophy” [Pol. 1282b23] – suggest, on the contrary, that he
will give it careful consideration. Like Schofield, then, my reading of Aristotle is philosophical
not ideological.

Schofield, however, along with much of the commentary, takes the content and
signification of “nature” in Politics I to be somehow given. He treats “the natural principles from
which Aristotle derives his theories of slavery” to be among the first principles of philosophy
and maintains that although “it is one thing to agree that Aristotle would proceed towards his
first principles dialectically, [it is] quite another to maintain that that is what he is doing in Pol. I.
He is not: in Pol. I he is arguing \textit{from} first principles” (Schofield 1999, 215 n26). I think this is
wrong.\textsuperscript{22} On my reading, Aristotle’s recourse to nature does not signal that his aims and method
in Politics I differ fundamentally from the rest of the Politics. And that he does not explicitly
return to the question of nature in his discussion of citizenship is not terribly significant. Aristotle
does not reopen the question of nature in Politic III not because nature is somehow separate from
politics, something to be dealt with and got out of the way before attending to the truly political but because he need not: the philosophical work he does in Politics I, which, on my reading, is continuous with and draws upon the work he does on nature in his scientific, metaphysical, and psychological writings, continues to hold throughout his treatise. Indeed, one of the benefits of my reading of Aristotle’s account of nature is that it produces a unified account of nature across Aristotle’s corpus. This is not to say that Politics I is foundational rather than dialectical. It is, on the contrary, as much a working out of what nature is in terms of politics as it is a working out of what politics is in terms of nature. Nature, on this interpretative strategy, does not stand outside the political, securing its boundaries and offering foundations. It is rather dependent upon politics and ethics even as these latter are dependent upon it. I justify this strategy through an exploration of Aristotle’s account of nature.

II. The Nature of Nature

To investigate whether what exists is one and motionless is not a contribution to the science of nature.

Aristotle, Physics 184b25-185a1

Aristotle understands the natural as what happens usually and for the most part, epi to polu. What happens usually and for the most part is a “modal” middle, which Aristotle distinguishes, on one side, from what is always, and on the other, from what is rare. If what is usually and for the most part corresponds to what is by nature, what is always corresponds to what is by necessity, and what is rare to what happens by accident. There is much to learn about Aristotle’s understanding of nature from this tripartite division. In an Aristotelian fashion, I begin my investigation of what is distinctive about the natural by looking first at what is not by nature: the necessary and the accidental.

The primary signification of the necessary, anagkaion, or the sense from which “all others are somehow derived,” is “that which cannot be otherwise” [Meta. 1015b3]. The
necessary also includes: the compulsory or forced, “that which is opposed to impulse or purpose” \[Meta. 1015a27\]; and what is true by demonstration, the first principles of knowledge \[Meta. 1015b7\]. The category of the necessary includes a range of significations across different fields of inquiry – ontology, epistemology, ethics – held together by a kind of family resemblance.\textsuperscript{26} What these significations share may be explored by looking at Aristotle’s epistemological and ethical treatments of the necessary in \textit{NE} \textit{VI.3} and \textit{NE III.1}, respectively. Discussing the intellectual virtue of scientific knowledge, \textit{episteme}, Aristotle says it studies what is eternal, ungenerated, and imperishable \[NE 1139b25\]. Think of numbers or figures. Always and invariable, they are necessary in that they are out-of-time and, hence, without motion. As form without matter, they may be precisely and scientifically studied.\textsuperscript{27} Although they may be studied by human beings, what is necessary or always is independent of human being. Their independence, along with their invariability, distinguishes the necessary understood as the first principles of knowledge. This feature is present as well in Aristotle’s understanding of necessity as compulsion or force: “actions are forced when the cause is in the external circumstances and the agent contributes nothing” \[NE 1101b1ff\]. The necessary, understood as that which cannot be otherwise in its ontological, epistemological, and ethical senses, shares a kinship with the past. What is past, Aristotle says, is not capable of not having taken place \[NE 1139b7-9\]. Once past, what has happened cannot be otherwise. People may study the past but, owing to its invariability, no one deliberates about the past \[NE 1139b7-9\]. Likewise, no one deliberates about eternal things for these cannot be brought about by our own efforts \[NE 1112a20ff\]. The past, like the first principles of knowledge, and like force or compulsion, is independent of human being; human agency cannot change it \[NE 1140a34\].

Counterpoised to the necessary and flanking the natural on the other side, is the accidental or the rare. “Accident” is what applies to something “but neither necessarily or usually” \[Meta. 1025a15\]. It is what can always be otherwise and so \textit{is} never, at least not in the way the invariable is. The accidental is contingent. It is what Aristotle associates with chance, \textit{tuche}, which he calls the indefinite, \textit{aorista}, and cites as the cause of accidents \[Meta. 1025a25\].
If what is necessary can be studied precisely and scientifically, what happens accidentally or by chance cannot be studied at all. Inexplicable, indeterminate, and random, chance or accidental events have no account of their own [Physics 197a18-19]. Although essentially unlike the necessary, the accidental and the necessary do have one thing in common: what happens by accident, like what happens necessarily, is independent of human being. If there is a kinship between the necessary and the past there is one as well between the accidental and the future: the accidental is the always possible, what lies uncertainly ahead.

Between “necessity and contingency,” between what is always and what is never, “between past and future,” lies what is by nature: what happens usually and for the most part. Unlike that which can never be otherwise and unlike that which is always otherwise, that which is by nature, as Aristotle’s definition in the Physics suggests, is both variable and stable: what is by nature has within itself a principle of change and resistance to change [Physics 192b13-14]. Neither motionless nor perpetually in motion, natural beings are. And they can also be otherwise. Owing to their relative stability, what is by nature, unlike what is by accident, can be studied. Owing to their relative variability, studies of what is by nature, unlike studies of the necessary, will be imprecise. Hence it is no wonder that scholars have found tensions in Aristotle’s account of nature. There is duality at the very heart of his understanding of nature. Because their possibilities may be actualized in any number of unpredictable ways, it is only by looking at what natural beings do that anything can be known about what they are. This means that claims about the identity of natural beings will be claims about their activities. This is why, in his inquiries into the nature of citizen and slave identity, Aristotle rejects status claims to focus on the activities of citizening and slaving.

The imprecise but nonetheless scientific accountability appropriate to studies of natural beings is evident in Aristotle’s biological sciences as well as in his ethics and politics, both in his self-described philosophical method and in his practice of it. Rejecting certainty as a standard for ethics and politics, Aristotle maintains that “we must ... be content if, in dealing with subjects starting from premises thus uncertain ... we seek the degree of precision which belongs to its
subject matter” [NE 1104a4, 1094b23; NE 1098a26-29, 1103b34-1104a5, 1165a13-14]. The imprecision inherent in the subject matter arises because what something is by nature is given by its characteristic activities. This means that the identity of a natural being will change should its characteristic activities change. There is thus an iterative quality to Aristotle’s studies of natural beings that accommodates the revision of his own conclusions in cases of identity change (Lear 1988, 43-54; Salkever 1990, ch.1).31

Even if what is by nature is variable, and even if the identity of a natural being is given by looking at its characteristic activities, is Aristotle nonetheless committed, as most commentators claim, to there being in truth something necessary about nature, something that somehow lurks behind or beyond a natural being’s characteristic activities to disclose its true identity (Swanson 1999)?32 To answer this question, let me take a closer look at what is at stake for Aristotle in keeping distinct the natural from the necessary (and from the accidental as well). To do this, I explore the boundaries of the category of the natural, for Aristotle often includes in it features which seem to belong more properly to the categories of the necessary and the accidental. Aristotle sometimes uses the phrase “what is always or for the most part” to refer to what is by nature, replacing “usually” with “always,” the term he associates with the necessary [Physics 199b15-18; Pol. CITE] Other times he seems to hold up as natural examples which are more rare than usual.33 Is there some way to understand these apparent category mistakes on Aristotle’s part? What might he have in mind when he claims of natural beings that they exhibit what one author has called an “almost necessity” (Frede 1992, 205)? And what might he have in mind when he appears to be associating the natural with the accidental or rare? Starting first with the apparent elision between nature and necessity, and looking next and much more briefly at the relation between the natural and the accidental (since the tendency is to read nature as necessity not as chance), I argue that while Aristotle takes necessity and chance to affect natural beings – indeed, he sees natural beings as singularly vulnerable to both – neither has a part, and they must have no part, in the essential definition of what is by nature.34 We have seen this already in Aristotle’s exclusion from consideration of force and accident in his investigations of citizenship
and slavery. We must now look more carefully at what underlies Aristotle’s exclusion of force and chance and his inclusion of what I call the “as if” necessary and accidental.

The identity of natural beings is discerned, we have seen, by looking at their activities. Because natural beings usually act thus and so, it is not hard to imagine patterns of activity becoming ingrained, indeed, so ingrained as to be justifiably treated as predictable and precise, which is to say, characteristic: a person who has acted courageously when confronted with danger will always do so, we might say, for she is that sort of person. We often speak in this way, and it might be said that the stability and security of our daily lives depend on the trust in the world that this way of speaking presupposes. We think, speak, and act, in other words, as if usual patterns of activity were compelled, as if they were necessary. Aristotle’s definition of “the usual” in the Physics makes this plain: what is by nature “always [tends] toward the same end, unless something intervenes” [Physics 199b15-18]. But though we think, speak, and act as if the usual were necessary, we think, speak, and act in this way knowing that it is always possible that things will turn out otherwise. There may come a point when the courageous person will meet a danger she cannot face down. We speak of “the always” in the case of natural beings only as if it were necessary. And this is at it should be; natural beings are stable, to be sure, but they are also essentially changeable and in constant interaction with their circumstances. Under different circumstances, natural beings act differently. When nature is assimilated to necessity, stasis and invariability control beings who, for Aristotle at least, are defined as well by movement and possibility.35

Aristotle is, indeed, vigilant against any more than an “as if” assimilation of nature to necessity. This vigilance is on display in his discussion of responsibility in NE III.1, where nature and necessity are brought into a confrontation. As noted earlier, Aristotle takes an agent’s actions to be compelled when the agent contributes nothing; the cause of the agent’s action is rather in external circumstances. Only two kinds of situations meet Aristotle’s definition of force or compulsion: when the agent acts without knowledge of the circumstances of action (and his ignorance is honest or innocent); or when a third party physically effects the action in the agent’s
place by, to use an anachronistic example, putting his hand over the agent’s when she is holding a gun and using his finger over hers to pull the trigger despite her efforts to resist. For all other actions, the agent, in Aristotle’s view, is responsible, for, as he puts it, the origin of action is in the agent \(NE 1111a23\). By comparison to modern legal definitions, Aristotle’s account of force is exceedingly limited: it does not include actions taken under conditions of duress, debilitating drunkenness, pent-up rage, and the like, when these conditions are brought about by the agent himself. For Aristotle, an agent’s actions are forced only when the agent has effectively not acted at all.

If Aristotle’s understanding of force is narrow, his account of responsibility is remarkably expansive:\(^{36}\)

\[V\]irtue depends on ourselves. And so also does vice. For where we are free to act we are also free to refrain from acting, and where we are able to say No we are also able to say Yes; if therefore we are responsible for doing a thing when to do it is right or noble, we are also responsible for not doing it when not doing it is base or wrong, and if we are responsible for rightly not doing a thing, then we are also responsible for wrongly doing it. But if it is in our power to refrain from doing right and wrong, and if ... being good or bad is doing right or wrong, it consequently depends on us whether we are good or evil \(NE 1113a6-14\).

What is at stake in Aristotle’s vigilance against assimilating responsibility to force is prohairetic activity. Prohairetic activity is also at stake in his vigilance against assimilating nature to necessity. In *Nicomachean Ethics*, necessity or compulsion – as that to which the agent contributes nothing, since the cause of action lies altogether outside the agent – stands opposed to human agency as that which has within itself its own principle, arche, of action. In the *Metaphysics*, the *Physics*, and elsewhere, force or necessity stands opposed to what is by nature as that which has within itself its own principle of motion and rest. Eliding nature and necessity makes virtue no more voluntary than vice \(NE 1114b14\). Human agency, responsibility, and self-determination disappear. What is by nature, then, reaches toward but remains distinct from
the necessary, and must remain distinct so as to preserve *prohairetic* activity.

What is by nature also reaches toward but remains distinct from the accidental. Aristotle recognizes the role of chance or luck in the lives of natural beings and the ameliorative effects of contingent external goods throughout the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics* (Nussbaum 1986, ch. 11). Chance and accident may crucially affect the quality of life of natural beings, but, as with necessity, Aristotle refuses to understand the identity of natural beings in terms of these factors. As we have seen, natural beings are accountable, but there is no accounting for what happens by chance, luck, and accident. The stakes here are no different from what they were in keeping distinct nature and necessity. Understanding the being of natural beings in terms of chance, like understanding it in terms of necessity, makes human agency, activity, and responsibility irrelevant.

If, on the side of the necessary, Aristotle enfolds into the category of the natural what I called the “as if” necessary, on the side of the accidental, he enfolds into the category of the natural the “as if” accidental, what, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he calls art, *techne*. Art is concerned neither with things that are or come into being by necessity nor with things that do so in accordance with nature. Art is rather “concerned with the same objects” as chance [*NE* 1140a13-18]. Both are concerned with possibility, with how something may come into being which is capable of being or not being [*NE* 1140a10]. Moreover, in art, as in chance, the finished work is not completely governed by the activity of producing [*NE* 1040a18]. Martin Heidegger puts it this way:

> The essential characteristic of the accidental is that what emerges from it is out of its hands. The same occurs in the case of techne; it may be developed in the most minute detail, and yet it does not have at its disposal, with absolute certainty, the success of the work. In the end, the ergon is out of the hands of techne (Heidegger 1997, 31).

“Art loves chance and chance loves art” says Aristotle, quoting Agathon approvingly [*NE* 1140a20]. But art is only “as if” accidental. Unlike chance, where the cause is altogether
indeterminate, in art, it is the blueprint in the soul or mind of the maker, *eidos*, that is the cause of action [*Meta. 1032b22ff.*]. There is, in other words, human agency in art but not in chance. This is not to deny the key difference Aristotle is at pains to underscore between the making of art and the doing which belongs to activity proper: in art, he says, the end is outside the activity of making; while doing is activity that has within itself its own end [*NE 1040b6-8*]. But even if the end product in art is outside the agent’s control, making, like doing, but unlike chance or necessity, crucially involves activity and responsibility.

III. The Power of Activity

I say that habit is but long practice, friend,
And this becomes nature for human beings in the end.

Evenus, quoted by Aristotle, *NE* 1152a35

The identity or nature of natural beings is bound up with or, more strongly put, effected by their characteristic self-determining activities and also by the work or products of these activities. This was noted, but left unexplained, in my initial sketch of Aristotle’s accounts of citizenship and slavery. It has now been more fully explored through Aristotle’s positioning of what is by nature between and against both what is by necessity and what is by accident. In keeping distinct what is by nature from force and from chance Aristotle has at stake *prohairetic* activity, that which characterizes and distinguishes human nature. And in including the “as if” necessary and the “as if” accidental in his account of the natural, Aristotle has at stake the expansiveness of his conception of responsibility. Again, agents, through their activities, make both themselves and the institutions which make them.

Is human nature all and only activity? The answer to this question is “yes” and “no.” Yes, in that, as we have seen, there is nothing necessary lurking behind activity. No, in that natural beings are distinguished by their stability as well as by their variability, by staying the same as well as change. Activity itself, in other words, is not all and only change. Activity, *energeia,*
alone cannot produce the movement, *kinesis*, and change, *metabole*, that characterize natural beings. And activity alone does not account for the nature of natural beings. For the nature of a being is not simply a description of what it tends to do. Activity may manifest itself in changeable and varied ways but, as we have seen, it also sets a standard, an internal and demanding one. To set a standard, activity must have the capacity or power to regulate itself. In what lies this capacity or power? In *dunamis*, variously translated as capacity, power, capability, potentiality.

Aristotle analyses the relation between capability, *dunamis*, and activity, *energeia*, in his confrontation with the Megarians in *Meta* IX.3. Since I am interested in what Aristotle’s analysis teaches about his understanding of activity, I leave to one side whether Aristotle’s description of the Megarian position is accurate. The Megarians, Aristotle recounts, say that a man who is not building cannot build, but only the man who is building and at the moment he is building [Meta. 1046b30ff]. On Aristotle’s reading of the Megarian view, it is only when a *dunamis* (or capability) is actually at work that the ability to do something is present. When it is not at work, the *dunamis*, as a capacity, is only potential, and so, absent. For the Megarians, as for some contemporary post-Nietzscheans, this means, activities emerge *ex nihilo*.

Aristotle thinks that this account of activity is absurd. When *dunamis* is treated as only present when it is in action, he argues, there can be no change or movement [Meta 1047a15]. Change or movement must happen from one thing to another. It is true that to be capable means to have a *dunamis*, and not having the *dunamis* means not being capable. But, on Aristotle’s view, *dunamis* has its own *energeia* or activity: the activity or actuality of *dunamis* (the activity or actuality of power) lies in its being possessed even when it is not at work. The builder can have the capability to build, this means, even when he is not actually building. Not building, then, does not necessarily signal the absence of *dunamis*, though it can, when, for example, the builder loses the capacity to build through bad luck (he loses his hands, say), or if he forgets how to build owing to the passage of time. Absent these conditions (under which there can be no building activity at all), activity or *energeia* emerges not from something only potential, i.e.
absent, but from *dunamis* understood, in Heidegger’s words, as “the withdrawal into itself of the capability such that it is primed for release, i.e. primed for activity” (Heidegger 1993, 158). *Dunamis*, as “the principle or source, *arche,* of change in some other thing or in the same thing qua other [Meta 1046a11; 1019a19-21], is the “power” of activity: it is what makes activity possible.

If *dunamis* powers activity, this does not make activity itself any less important. *Dunamis* may be that from out of which change occurs – that which initiates activity – but it is not something inert, waiting to move to action. Rather, it effects change by way of its actualization, by doing its work. How does a capacity actualize itself as capability? Through practice. It is by performing the activities for which it is holding itself in readiness that a *dunamis* becomes capable in the first place. It is, in other words, by building that a builder becomes capable of building [Meta 1046b34-36]. The activity of building gives the builder the capability to build, the capacity to be a builder. And one is a builder only in the way one is a courageous person, for example, which is to say, only so long as the disposition to build shows itself from time to time in the activity of building. Identity or human nature is not given all and only by activity on Aristotle’s understanding, for activities come out of capabilities. There are, so to say, doers behind deeds. Who the doer is, however, is not once and for all determined, but is rather continually produced by the activities one has performed and continues to perform. There can be no activity without capability, but there can also be no capability without activity. Each depends on the other. It is this interdependence between *energeia* and *dunamis* that makes possible the changes over time and movement that define natural beings.

Commentators have taken Aristotle’s definition of nature in *Meta. V.4* to be equivocal. They say he defines nature in two senses and they criticize him for sometimes favoring one and sometimes the other (Annas 1993, 146; Irwin 1985, 416-417). As “the principle of motion in natural beings, which is somehow inherent in them, either potentially, *dunamei,* or actually, *entelecheia*” [Meta. 1015a18-19], it is true that Aristotle’s definition of nature involves duality. He takes form, or *energeia* to be the *telos* of natural beings, and so to be primary and guiding
and he also understands form to take its guiding orientation from matter, much in the way the shape of a statue may appear to its sculptor from out of the clay. In one sense, he says, nature is the primary stuff – matter – and, in another sense, it is form. In one sense, it is the immanent thing from which a growing thing first begins to grow (matter or dunamis); in another sense, it is the genesis of growing things, energeia. Nature as energeia is growth or activity. But this is not to equivocate. For in the Metaphysics, as in the Physics, the Nicomachean Ethics, and the Politics, the sense of nature that Aristotle takes to be primary and guiding is nature neither as an origin nor as an end separable from growth. It is both, and it is captured in the process of growth itself.

A natural being becomes and reveals its nature as it grows, changes over, and moves through time, in other words, as it acts. This way of understanding nature fits well with Aristotle’s treatment of nature as a telos and of telei more generally: “For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best” [Pol. 1252b31-1253a1; see also Movement of Animals 698b10-15; and Physics 194a24-31]. It is the end or telos, this suggests, which guides movement and without which there could be no movement, only randomness. To be an end, however, is to exist in the present, as a possibility. And for something to be a possibility for a natural being depends on its past. The end or the completion of a natural being’s coming-into-being, this means, is not separable from the growth process itself. The telos does not stand over and against the process of coming-into-being, directing it only from without but is, rather, paradoxical: its tense is futural while its focus is not on the future but on what is possible in the here and now as it emerges from out of the past.

Nature, on this reading, is an end and a beginning all at once, which is to say, an ongoing process, a remarkably expansive middle. It is the domain of human activity and the domain of politics [NE 1103b26-30, 1095b34-1-96a2]. Situated between past and future, between necessity and contingency, and composed of matter and form, of dunamis and energeia, of origin, arche, and end, telos, nature – including human nature or identity – is, for Aristotle, a unity in
difference.

Politics is an art, and so a product of citizen activity. It produces the institutions that make and unmake human identities. It is the art that Aristotle takes to be integral to any understanding of the practices of citizens and to their identities. It is because what is by nature is defined by the practice and effects of human activity under three aspects – as self-determining activity, as guided making of citizens by institutions, and as making by citizens of institutions – that Aristotle can, without inconsistency, treat human beings and, indeed, the polity itself as both natural and made [Pol. 1253a30, 1252b30ff.].

Endnotes

1 In her writings on Aristotle’s ethics and science, Nussbaum offers a nuanced treatment of Aristotle on nature, and there are key points of convergence between her reading of Aristotle on nature and my own (Nussbaum 1986, Part III). It is when she turns to what this mandates for politics that her Aristotle emerges as essentialist and objectivist, a reading I reject (Nussbaum 1988, 1990, 1992).


3 This is not to say that human nature depends upon political determination or can only be defined via political contestation, since, for Aristotle, human nature is the subject of empirical inquiry. It is to insist that human nature is, in part, constituted by political activity.

4 “The general question about the nature of “what is” ... is equivalent to, the question about ... ousia ... a question of identity.” (Nussbaum, Encyclopedia, 386). That the “who is” question is one about nature and identity is evident from the translations. Rackham 1977, 173 and Barker 1969, 92 ask about the “nature” of the citizen; Jowett 1993, 51, Reeve 1998, 65, and Robinson 1995, 3 ask “who is a citizen?”; Lord 1984, 86 asks “what the citizen is.”
The question of citizenship, this means, is a question of distributive justice. The parallels between Aristotle’s discussion of citizenship here in Pol. III.1 and his discussion of distributive justice in Pol. III.9-12 are noteworthy.

These are not all the same but the differences do not matter for my purposes here. See Nichols 1992, 55-61 for discussion of the differences.

This is not always the case: Aristotle calls Theramenes an exemplary citizen in the Constitution of Athens for refusing to follow the laws of the polity. Being a good citizen calls for disobeying the laws when there ceases to be a difference between the polity’s laws and force, when nomos becomes bie.

For an excellent discussion of the relation between making and doing in the context of Aristotle’s Poetics, see Davis 1992, ch.8.

Winthrop 1975, 410, explains the pun on Larissaeans which names both the people and the artefact.

Aristotle’s example is the foreigners and alien slaves supposedly enrolled by the Athenian reformer Cleisthenes, and so made citizens “in one stroke,” after the expulsion of the tyrant Hippias in 510 B.C.E. See, for discussion of the interpretative controversies around this example, Manville 1997, 173-209, esp. p.191. See also Constitution of Athens 20.1, 21.2 and Politics 1319b19-27.

Prohairesis is generally translated as choice but its difference from voluntaristic conceptions of choice is signaled by the prefix “pro” which is like our prefix “pre” in prejudice, i.e. pre-judgment, or pre-choice. Prejudice may be most familiar to us for its derogatory aspects, but pre-judgments always operate in our orientation to the world, underscoring the embeddedness (but not determinism) of our actions. For some writers, Aristotle’s ethics and politics are rule-
centered; for others, they are agent-centered. Some agent-centered accounts such as much of virtue-ethics are more properly characterized as rule-centered insofar as virtue ethicists seek in Aristotle prescriptions for action. My account has much in common with non-virtue ethics agent-centered accounts such as those by Salkever 1990 and Gerald Mara 1995, 1998, 2000. Unlike them, however, I locate the heart of agency in human activity.

12 On Ober’s view, however, Aristotle is no friend of democracy.

13 Even as they condition its possibility for others: Pol. 1328a35-35; 1328b19-22; 1329a35-36.

14 I focus on slavery since it is the hard case for the claim I am making about nature. The argument I am making about human nature applies as well to women, working farmers, shopkeepers, and metics. It is to be noted that nowhere in his biological writings does Aristotle speak of human beings as natural slaves. On the contrary, “as members of the human species, all human beings are potentially political animals with the capacity for articulate speech” (Arnhart 1998, 171).

15 And so too is a master a master in being a master, a mode of activity no more conducive to citizenizing than is slaving [Pol. IV.11].

16 See also Pol. 1344b15ff for discussion of freeing of slaves which presumes the capacity to cease being a slave.

17 Contra Nichols 1992, 6 where she claims that the distinction between slaves and masters is absolute. It is to be noted, though, that at p. 184, n. 2, she says that the distinction is a matter of degree. There is evidence in Aristotle that the difference between masters and slaves is a difference in kind: see Pol. 1259b28 though this appears in a passage which concludes that both must share in a measure of excellence.

18 For other tensions in Aristotle’s account, see Smith 1991, Davis 1996, ch.1, Barker1959, ch. 9,
and Schlaifer 1936.

19 Swanson 1999 argues that although Aristotle understands nature to be changeable, he presents his conclusions based on nature dogmatically for two reasons: first, only the few philosophers can properly appreciate nature’s changeability; and secondly, to discourage “political challenges to the natural order in the name of progress or freedom” (p. 225). While I agree that Aristotle understands nature to be essentially changeable, I disagree with Swanson’s explanation of Aristotle’s rhetorical approach to this question.

20 “That is why they are mistaken who forbid us to converse with slaves and say that we should employ command only, for slaves stand even more in need of admonition than children” [Pol. 1260b5-7].

21 For accounts which treat Aristotle as an embarrassed apologist of slavery, see Williams 1993, 103-29; Waldron 1992. For accounts which treat Aristotle as a product of his times, see Annas 1993, 153, 155; Annas 1996; Saunders 1995, 79-83. For accounts which treat Aristotle as incoherent, see references at note XX above.

22 Aristotle explains the philosophical purpose of dialectic in the Topics 101a35-37. For discussion, see Witt 1992. See also Mara 1998, who argues for the importance of Aristotle’s dialogic approach in establishing his epistemological positions; and Nussbaum 1986, 243-4 who argues that Aristotle does not deploy different philosophical methods when discussing nature from those he uses to discuss politics and ethics.

23 Aristotle returns to the topic of nature in Pol. VII, which explicitly reprises his treatment of the human soul and its work initiated in Pol. I.

24 I take the word “modal” from Frede 1992.

25 As is evident from Aristotle’s treatments of citizenship and slavery, his tendency throughout is
to investigate what something is by first determining what it is not.

26 There are other significations that belong here as well: that without which life would be impossible, namely respiration and food [Meta 1015a20-22]; and the conditions without which good cannot be or come to be [Meta. 1015a22-23]. These are akin in the same way the different uses of the term “good” discussed by Aristotle in NE I.6 are akin: in the language he uses there, these different uses are “one by analogy.” Understanding the term “good” by analogy can accommodates its uses “in the category of substance and in that of quality and in that of relation...” [NE 1096a22ff.] without eliding the differences among these uses. Likewise, understanding the term “necessary” by analogy allows its application to these disparate domains, and accommodates the ways in which these applications are the same and different.

27 By the intellectual virtues of science, episteme, and philosophic wisdom, theoria. Other interesting features of invariable beings: there is no possibility of falsity in regard to these sorts of beings; they are immediately apprehended by intellect, nous; and they are without language, alogos. See, for elaboration, NE VI. 2-3, 6-7.

28 Which is to say, like what is necessary which is apprehended immediately by intellect, nous, and so is without language, account, or reason logos, what is by accident cannot be apprehended at all and so has no reason, logos. There is a sense of “accident” that can be eternal which is not relevant for my purposes: see Meta. 1025a30ff.


30 Aristotle uses this method to come to knowledge about nature in On the Soul where he explores the characteristic activities of the soul to investigate its nature and in the Nicomachean Ethics as well where he looks at the characteristic activities of human beings to explore their nature. For an excellent discussion of this method, see Salkever 1990, ch 3.
31 Lear makes this point about Aristotle’s treatment of the heart. On the basis of his observations, Aristotle came to what we now know to be mistaken conclusions about the role of the heart and how it works. Stressing the bi-directional commitment of Aristotles’ scientific approach, “from reality to its rationality and rationality back to its reality,” (p. 45), Lear makes the case that Aristotle’s scientific method can revise its own conclusions.

32 Swanson 1991 insists on there being an apodictic truth about nature alongside nature’s changeability. Annas 1993, 144, 147, 158, and Irwin 1985, 416-17 distinguish two senses of nature in Aristotle: “mere nature,” prevalent in Aristotle’s ethical and political treatises, although not, Annas says, in *Politics* I which is plastic, and, if we are to flourish, must be guided, nurtured, and improved upon by habits, virtues, and practical reason; and a “strong sense of nature” – an application of Aristotle’s *Physics* notion of nature – which Aristotle uses, in *Politics* I among other places, not only in reference to natural slavery, but in reference to the naturalness of the polity and of certain activities of property as well. The strong sense of nature, according to Annas, is “not just a pre-ethical starting point, but something which provides ethical goals – goals indeed which Aristotle thinks should control political institutions to a great extent.”(p. 146) Limiting the influence of these “externalities,” it is best understood as “the end of the process, not the beginning” Annas 1996, 735.

33 As in the case of property acquisition and use where Aristotle calls natural not the more usual practices of exchange and retail trade, but rather immediate use of things necessary to the end of living [*Pol. I.3*]. Annas 1996, 733 treats these as evidence of Aristotle’s inconsistent use of nature and of his illegitimate elision of the natural with the ideal.

34 This point can be put another way as well: force and accident are without language or without an account, *alos*, and so can have no part in the essential definition of the human being who is, after all, the being with language or accountability, *zoon logon echon*. 

36 Some have argued too expansive and too demanding since Aristotle does not consider duress, for example, as an excuse for bad action. He does, however, advocate taking justifications and other mitigating factors into account when determining how to respond to actions taken under difficult conditions [Rhét. 1374b13-16].

37 My analysis here draws on Heidegger 1995, ch.3.

38 There are similarities between the Megarian appreciation of dunamis and that of Arendt 1958, 200, who calls dunamis or power that which “springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they disperse.” See also p. 208.

39 Along similar lines, Aristotle remarks that “distance does not break off friendship absolutely, but only the activity of it. But if the absence is lasting, it seems actually to make men forget their friendship” [NE 1157b6-13].

40 Annas 1996, 735 n12 understands Aristotle here to be “adding to” his Physics’ account of nature as the internal source of change “the point that a thing’s nature is both the matter from which the change begins and also the substance or form which is the telos of the completed change.” See also Annas 1993, 146. Calling the matter from which the change begins “mere nature” and the form or telos of the completed change the “strong sense of nature,” Annas disaggregates what, for Aristotle, co-constitutes natural beings: matter and form or dunamis and energeia [On the Soul 412a10]: Irwin 1985, 416-17, makes the same mistake. Arnhart 1998, 36-39, by contrast, treats nature as “both original potential and developed potential.”

41 For telos in Aristotle as primary and guiding, see Lear 1983, ch. 2; Nussbaum and Putnam 1992.
References

Aristotle Texts


Other Texts


Press.


